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Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals were introduced in
Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.  As a result, temporary
employment increased from around 10% in the mid-eighties to more than 30% in the
early nineties.  In  1997, however, the Spanish government attempted to reduce the
incidence of temporary employment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for
permanent contracts.  In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish Labor
Force Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes and dismissal costs on the
distribution of employment and worker flows.  We exploit the fact that recent reforms
apply only to certain demographic groups to set up a natural experiment research design
that can be used to study the effects of contract regulations.  Our results show that the
reduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employment of young
workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for young women are not always
significant.  Results for older workers show insignificant effects.  The results suggest a
moderately elastic response of permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for
young men.  We also find positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and
temporary employment into permanent employment for young and older workers,
although the effects for older workers are not always significant.  On the other hand,
transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increased only for older
men, suggesting that the reform had little effect on dismissals.
Keywords:  Temporary Employment, Dismissal Costs, Payroll Taxes, European
Unemployment.
JEL Codes: J23, J32, J38, J63, J65.1
I.  Introduction
The European unemployment crisis has motivated extensive debate about the
role of labor market institutions in exacerbating unemployment.  Concern with possible
adverse effects of inflexibility has stimulated research and calls for reform.  While a
role for institutions is superficially appealing, the evidence for their importance has
been mixed (see, e.g.,  Nickell and Layard (1999) for a recent survey) and the
interpretation of results remains controversial.  One reason the causal effect of
institutional changes has been difficult to establish is the lack of sharp changes or
reforms that can be used for measurement.  Most institutional changes in the European
context have been either gradual or so widespread that it is difficult to identify control
groups that can be used to establish a non-reform baseline for comparison.
A second important feature of most reforms to date, and consequently of efforts
to evaluate these reforms, is that they are “reforms at the margin” which fail to
introduce a fundamental liberalization.  In fact, some reforms may simply add further
distortions.   The most important example of this is the introduction of temporary
contracts, a common liberalization strategy in Western Europe.  Rather than reducing
dismissal costs for permanent contracts, these reforms introduced temporary
employment contracts that are not subject to dismissal costs.  Allowing the use of
temporary contracts without dismissal costs is, however, not equivalent to reducing
dismissal costs on permanent contracts.  The introduction of this new type of contract
may increase the wages of permanent workers and have undesirable consequences for
output, employment, and segmentation of the labor market.
1
                                                          
1 See, for example, Blanchard and Landier (2002); Dolado, Garcia-Serrano, and Jimeno (2002), and
Bertola and Ichino (1995).2
In this paper, we asses the impact of a recent reform in the Spanish labor market.
A study of the recent Spanish experience is especially compelling because, in contrast
with the majority of Continental reforms, Spain’s 1997 Reform bill, extended in 2001,
marks a sharp change for some groups (i.e., young workers, older workers, the long-
term unemployed, women under-represented in their occupations, and disabled
workers), while leaving other groups unaffected.  This presents an opportunity to set up
a treatment-control design that may provide more reliable estimates of reform effects
than past efforts.  A second unique feature of recent Spanish reforms is that, unlike
previous “reforms at the margin,” they led to sharp reductions in payroll taxes and
dismissal costs for permanent contracts.  Consequently, these reforms may provide a
better estimate of the elasticity of permanent employment with respect to non-wage
labor costs.
The theoretical section of the paper presents a model with temporary and
permanent contracts to illustrate the impact of reduced payroll taxes and dismissal costs
on employment.  The model is similar to Blanchard and Landier (2000), but it
endogenizes dismissals and introduces payroll taxes.  In our model, a reduction in
dismissal costs for permanent contracts increases conversions of temporary into
permanent employment, but it also increases dismissals of permanent workers so the net
effect on permanent employment is ambiguous.  By contrast, a reduction in payroll
taxes increases conversions but leaves dismissals unchanged, so its net effect is to
increase permanent employment.
The empirical analysis examines the impact of the 1997 reform on employment
and worker flows using data from the Spanish labor force survey from the second
quarter of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 2000.  The Spanish LFS collects basic individual3
and family information, as well as labor market information, including type of
employment contract.  In addition, the LFS has a rotating panel structure that allows us
to estimate quarterly transition probabilities.
Our results suggest the reform increased permanent employment probabilities
for young workers, although the effects for young women are not always significant.
The results for young men are robust to controls for common macro shocks for all age
groups, for sector- and province-specific trends, and for age-specific cyclical effects.
Results for older workers show smaller and insignificant effects.  The estimates also
show increased quarterly transition probabilities from non-employment to permanent
employment for young and older men, although the results for older men are not always
significant, and from temporary to permanent employment for young men and women
during the reform years.  On the other hand, transition probabilities from permanent
employment to non-employment increased for older men, accounting for weak net
employment effects for this group.  An implication of these findings is that costly
permanent contracts and high payroll taxes inhibit employment growth in Spain.  The
results also suggest that reducing the costs of permanent employment may be of special
value for younger workers.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the institutional
framework and the Spanish labor market reforms.  Section III presents a theoretical
analysis of reductions in payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanent contracts
introduced by recent reforms.  Section IV explains the natural experiment research
design used to evaluate the impact of the 1997 reform.  Section V describes the data and
presents estimates of  the effects of the reform on employment levels, accessions,
conversions, and separations.  We conclude in Section VI.4
II.  The Spanish Labor Market Reforms
The Spanish labor market has been marked by substantial changes in
employment protection legislation over the last two decades.  Following the transition to
democracy in 1978, Spain introduced labor legislation which maintained many
restrictions on dismissals first put into practice during the Franco years.  This legislation
established that firms could dismiss workers for “personal reasons,” in which case the
firm had to prove the worker’s incompetence or absenteeism; and “economic reasons,”
in which case the firm had to prove its need to reduce employment due to technological,
organizational, or productive causes.  Dismissals justified by “economic reasons”
required advance notice.
Workers dismissed for “personal reasons” could appeal to labor courts.  The
severance payment awarded depended on whether judges ruled the dismissal as “fair” or
“unfair.”  A dismissal was ruled as “fair” if the employer was able to prove the worker’s
incompetence or absenteeism and “unfair” otherwise.  In case of fair dismissals, firms
had to pay 20 days out of the salary per year of seniority, with a maximum of 12
months.  In the case of unfair dismissals, firms had to pay 45 days per year of seniority
out of the salary, with a maximum of 42 months.  Severance payments for “economic
reasons” were the same as for fair dismissals under “personal reasons.”  In practice, this
legislation turned out to be very stringent because judges ruled dismissals as unfair in
the majority of cases.  Moreover,  approval for dismissals under “economic reasons”
was often granted only when there was an agreement between employers and workers,
which was achieved in most cases by raising severance payments above the legally
established amounts.5
The Spanish government introduced the first reform designed to reduce
dismissal costs in 1984.  Since an across-the-board reduction of dismissal costs was
politically impossible, the reform liberalized the use of temporary contracts.  Temporary
contracts required lower severance payments than permanent contracts when the
contract terminated at term.  In particular, temporary workers were entitled to 12 days
per year of seniority based on the salary and could not be appealed in labor courts.
As a result of the 1984 reform, the proportion of employees under temporary
contracts increased from 10% during the 1980’s to over 30% in the early 1990’s.
Between 1985 and 1994, over 95% of all new hires were employed through temporary
contracts and the conversion rate from temporary to permanent contracts was only
around 10%.
2  The main concern with the liberalization of temporary contracts after
1984 was that it generated segmentation between unstable low-paying jobs and stable
high-paying jobs, without appearing to reduce unemployment.
Shifting direction in light of these concerns, in 1994 new regulations limited the
use of temporary employment contracts to seasonal jobs.
3   In practice, however,
employers continued to hire workers under temporary contracts for all types of jobs and
not just for seasonal jobs.  In addition, the 1994 reform slightly relaxed dismissal
conditions for permanent contracts.  In particular, the definition of fair dismissals was
widened by including additional “economic reasons” for dismissals.  In practice,
approval for dismissals under “economic reasons” continued to be granted mainly when
there was an agreement between employers and workers and labor courts continued to
                                                          
2 See Güell-Rottlan and Petrongolo (2000).
3 In the case of workers over 45 years of age, temporary contracts could be continued to be used for all
types of jobs and not only for seasonal jobs until 1995.  After 1995, however, the use of temporary
contracts for the over 45 age group, as for the rest of workers, was limited to seasonal jobs.6
rule most dismissals as unfair, so that dismissal costs on permanent contracts did not
change much.
The perceived ineffectiveness of the 1994 reform led to a new reform in 1997,
which was eventually extended in 2001.  As with the 1994 reform, the goal of the 1997
and 2001 reforms was to reduce the use of temporary contracts.  However, rather than
trying to limit the use of temporary contracts by further possibly ineffective regulation,
the new reform increased the incentives for firms to hire workers in certain population
groups using permanent contracts.  In particular, the 1997 reform reduced dismissal
costs for unfair dismissals by about 25% and payroll taxes between 40% and 90% for
newly signed permanent contracts and for conversions of temporary into permanent
contracts after the second quarter of 1997 for workers under 30 years of age, over 45
years of age, the long-term unemployed, women under-represented in their occupations,
and disabled workers.
Key provisions of the 1997 reform are summarized in Table 1.  Severance
payments for unfair dismissals of newly signed contracts of workers in affected groups
were reduced from 45 to 33 days out of the salary per year of seniority and the
maximum was reduced from 42 to 24 months out of the salary.  In addition, given the
high payroll tax rate in Spain (i.e., 28.3% of the salary), the reform reduced payroll
taxes between 40% and 90% for workers in these population groups hired under
permanent contracts.
4  Table 1 shows that payroll tax reductions went from 40% for
workers under 30 years of age and for long-term unemployed, to between 70% and 90%
                                                          
4 Payroll taxes are generally high in all Continental Europe (with Denmark being an exception) and have
often being pointed as an explanation for high unemployment in Europe.  Laroque and Salanie (2002),
and Kramarz and Philippon (1999) study the consequences of high payroll taxes in France.7
for disabled workers.  Table 1 shows that in some cases payroll taxes were also reduced
after the second year of employment.
5
The research value of the 1997 reform is partly due to the fact that the new
regulations affected different groups of workers differently.  In particular, the 1997
reform changed payroll taxes and dismissal costs over time differently for different
population groups: younger and older workers, the long-term unemployed, women
under-represented in their occupations, and disabled workers.  Our estimation strategy
exploits the temporal as well as the cross-section variation to evaluate the impact of the
reduction in payroll taxes and dismissal costs on employment levels and flows.
The 1997 reform led to a sharp and sustained increase in the number of
permanent contracts for workers in some affected groups.  This can be seen in Figures 1
and 2, which plot the total number of newly signed permanent contracts and
conversions of temporary into permanent contracts for men and women, respectively.
The figures show that the number of newly signed permanent contracts increased
sharply for young workers and older men, and to a lesser extent for older women, after
the second quarter of 1997, but remained roughly constant for the long-term
unemployed and disabled workers.  On the other hand, the number of regular permanent
contracts (i.e., contracts not subject to reductions in payroll taxes and dismissal costs)
initially decreased in 1997 and then increased but at a lower rate than for younger
workers.   The figures also show a marked rise in the number of conversions of
temporary into permanent contracts after the second quarter of 1997 for both men and
women.  The sharp rise in conversions and new permanent contracts for young and
                                                          
5 The 2001 reform which became effective in January 2001 essentially extended the 1997 reform, but
applied the lower subsidies for contracts signed in 1999 mentioned in Table 1.8
older workers after the second quarter of 1997 suggests the reform affected these groups
of workers.
III.  Theoretical Consequences of the Reform
This model illustrates the effects of reductions in payroll taxes and dismissal
costs for permanent contracts, such as those introduced by the 1997 reform, when there
are both temporary and permanent contracts in the economy.  The model is similar to
Blanchard and Landier’s (2002) model but endogenizes dismissals of permanent
workers and introduces payroll taxes to evaluate the impact of the reform.
Firms have a discount factor r, and they create and fill vacancies using
temporary and permanent contracts.   There is a cost K from creating a vacancy, which
can be filled instantaneously by hiring workers from the pool of the unemployed (i.e.,
the matching technology is such that there are “workers waiting at the gate”).
All jobs start with temporary contracts, which have productivity εo.  The
productivity of permanent  jobs at a point in time, ε, is the realization of match-
idiosyncratic productivity shocks, ε´, drawn from a distribution G with support [εo,εm].
Both temporary and permanent jobs are subject to productivity shocks with
instantaneous probability λ, where the new match-idiosyncratic productivity is drawn
from the distribution G.  Temporary jobs hit by shocks are either terminated or
converted into permanent jobs, while permanent jobs hit by shocks are either terminated
or continued.  While temporary jobs are not subject to dismissal costs, permanent jobs
are subject to dismissal costs, F, which are assumed to be pure waste.  Both temporary
and permanent jobs are subject to payroll taxes.  Payroll taxes for temporary and
permanent jobs are a fraction sT and sP of wages wT and wP, respectively.  The values of9
temporary and permanent jobs are JT(εo) and JP(ε) and given by the following Bellman
equations:
rJT(εo) = εo − ( 1+sT )wT(εo) + λE( JP(ε´)−JT(εo) ε´ ≥ ε ),
rJP(ε) = ε − ( 1+sP )wP(ε) + λE( JP(ε´)−JP(ε) ε´ ≥ε  ) + λ(JT(εo)−JP(ε)−F)G(ε  ),
where ε is the threshold match-idiosyncratic productivity at which firms are indifferent
between dismissing and converting temporary into permanent jobs, andε is the
threshold match-idiosyncratic productivity at which firms are indifferent between
dismissing and retaining workers.
The labor force is normalized to 1.  Individuals are infinitely lived, risk-neutral
and have a discount factor r.  Workers employed in temporary and permanent jobs
receive wages wT and wP  and a fraction of benefits b  financed by firms’ payroll
contributions for temporary and permanent jobs, sTwT and sPwP (where b=1 implies a
perfect link between benefits and contributions).  Workers dismissed from permanent
jobs and whose temporary jobs end enter unemployment.  Unemployed workers have
zero utility and they must start with temporary jobs before moving up to permanent
jobs.  The  arrival rate of temporary jobs is ϕ=h/u, where h are total hires and u
unemployment.  The value to a worker of being employed in a temporary job with
productivity εo, of being employed in a permanent job with productivity ε, and of being
unemployed are WT(εo), WP(ε), and U, and are given by the following Bellman
equations:
rWT(εo) = ( 1+bsT )wT(εo) + λE( WP(ε´)−WT(εo) ε´ ≥ ε ) + λ( U−WT(εo) ) G(  ε ),
rWP(ε) = ( 1+bsP )wP(ε) + λE( WP(ε´)−WP(ε) ε´ ≥ε ) + λ( U−WP(ε) )G(ε  ),
rU = ϕ( WT(εo)−U ).
Free  entry  implies  that  the  number  of  vacancies is determined by zero net profit,10
JT( εo ) = K.  Moreover, since the value of permanent jobs increases with the match-
idiosyncratic productivity, ε , the conversion threshold, ε, above which temporary jobs
are converted into permanent jobs and the dismissal threshold,ε, below which
permanent workers are dismissed are given by the following equations:
JP( ε ) = JT( εo ) = K
(1)
JP(ε  ) = JT( εo ) − F
(2)
Wages in both types of jobs are set by symmetric Nash bargaining, with
continuous renegotiation.  The Nash-bargaining conditions for temporary and
permanent jobs are:
JT( εo ) − K = WT( εo ) − U,
(3)
JP( ε ) − JT( εo ) +  F = WP( ε ) − U
(4)
Substituting the free-entry condition into equation (3) implies that the value of being
employed in a temporary job is equal to the value of being unemployed, WT( εo ) = U,
and both are equal to zero.  Integrating equation (4) over ε and εm, yields
E(JP(ε´)−WP(ε´)ε´ ≥ ε ) = (K−F)(1−G( ε )).  Using this together with the fact that the
value of being unemployed is zero and with the Bellman equations for a temporary job
yields the temporary wage,
wT(εo) = [εo − rK − λF( 1−G( ε ) )] / [2 + ( 1+b )sT].
Similarly, integrating (4) over ε and εm, yields E( JP(ε´)−WP(ε´)ε´  ≥  ε ) =
(K−F)(1−G(ε )).  This together with the fact that the value of being unemployed is zero
and with the Bellman equations for a permanent job yields the permanent wage,
wP(ε) = [ε − r( K−F )] / [2 + ( 1+b )sP].11
There is a unique wage for temporary jobs, since they all have the same level of
productivity, εo.  On the other hand, wages in permanent jobs depend on the match-
idiosyncratic productivity, ε.
Substituting wages and the free-entry condition into the value of a permanent
job, and evaluating at the conversion and dismissal thresholds yields two equations
which define the conversion and dismissal thresholds implicitly,
(r+λ)K = {[(1+bsP) ε + r(K−F)]/[2 + (1+b)sP]} + λE( JP(ε´) ε´≥ε ) + λ(K−F)G(ε )
 (5)
(r+λ)(K−F) = {[(1+bsP)ε + r(K−F)]/[2+(1+b)sP]} + λE( JP(ε´) ε´≥ε ) + λ(K−F)G(ε )
(6)
Subtracting (6) from (5) yields
ε −ε  = [2 + ( 1+b )sP] ( r+λ )F / [ 1+bsP ].
Substituting the permanent wage into the value of permanent job, and then
integrating by parts and using the threshold conditions (1) and (2), yields the individual
thresholds,
ε = ( r+λ )( K−F ) − λεm / r + λ( G( εm )−G(ε )) / r,
ε = ( r+λ )K − λεm / r + λ( G( εm )−G(ε )) / r + ( r+λ )( 1+sP )F / ( 1+bsP ),
Comparative statics on these thresholds show that a reduction in dismissal costs
reduces the difference between the conversion and dismissal thresholds both because
the conversion threshold falls and because the dismissal threshold increases.  A
reduction in payroll taxes for permanent jobs also reduces the difference between the
conversion and dismissal thresholds as long as the link between benefits and
contributions is not perfect.  In this case, however, only the conversion threshold falls.
Given the values of the two productivity thresholds, we can derive the steady-
state values of unemployment, temporary employment and permanent employment. The12
flow out of unemployment has to equal the flow into unemployment as well as the flow
into temporary jobs, so ϕu = λ[eTG( ε ) + ePG(ε )] = λeT.  Using the steady state
conditions and the identity u + eT + eP = 1, yields the steady state values of
unemployment, temporary employment and permanent employment,
u = [ λG(ε ) ] / [ λG(ε ) + ϕ ( G(ε )+λ(1−G( ε )) ) ],
eT = [ϕG(ε ) ] / [ λG(ε ) + ϕ ( G(ε )+λ(1−G( ε )) ) ],
eP = [ϕ(1−G( ε )) ] / [ λG(ε ) + ϕ ( G(ε )+λ(1−G( ε )) ) ].
For given ϕ, unemployment and temporary employment increase with ε andε, while
permanent employment decreases with ε andε.  Consequently, a reduction in dismissal
costs has an ambiguous effect on permanent employment and a reduction in payroll
taxes increases permanent employment if the link between benefits and contributions is
not perfect.
As in Blanchard and Landier, which looks at the effect of reducing dismissal
costs for temporary contracts, our theoretical discussion suggests the reduction in
dismissal costs for permanent contracts increases hiring and dismissal and has
ambiguous effects on unemployment.  In contrast, while Blanchard and Landier find
that reducing temporary dismissal costs reduces permanent conversions and increases
the perm-temp wage differential, here a reduction in permanent dismissal costs
increases permanent conversions and reduces the wage differential.  Thus, unlike
previous reforms affecting temporary contracts only, the 97 reform should reduce labor
market segmentation.
IV.  Identification Strategy
Our goal in this paper is to identify the impact of reduced payroll taxes and
dismissal costs on permanent contracts.  To this end, we compare treated groups under13
30 and over 45 years of age with the control group of middle-aged workers before and
after the 1997 reform.  We concentrate on contrasts by age group since other treated
groups - the long-term unemployed and women under-represented in certain
occupations - may be self-selected.  While self-selection is not as much of a concern for
disabled workers, unfortunately our data does not allow us to distinguish disabled
workers.  Moreover, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 above, the greatest impact of the
reform appears to have been on the two affected age groups.
The identification strategy is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, which plot permanent
employment probabilities for men and women by age group relative to the base period,
first quarter of 1997, for the same years as Figures 1 and 2 (i.e., 1995-2000).
6  The
figures show that permanent employment probabilities started to increase after the
implementation of the reform (i.e., second quarter of 1997) and that the increase was
greatest for younger workers.  Since the reform was introduced during an expansion,
Figures 5 and 6 plot the permanent employment probabilities for men and women for
the entire period for which we have data (i.e., 1987 to 2000), which spans another
expansion in the late 1980’s and a recession in the early 1990’s.  As before, these
figures show the increase in permanent employment probabilities for the young after the
second quarter of 1997, but they also show higher permanent employment probabilities
for the young during the expansion of the late 1980’s.  The figures highlight the
importance of proper control for cyclical effects, especially because the young appear to
benefit disproportionately during expansions.  On the other hand, the figures show
similar permanent employment probabilities during the two expansions, even though the
expansion of the late 1980’s was stronger than the expansion of the late 1990’s in terms
of GDP growth.14
To control for age-specific cyclical effects, we use a triple differences estimator
which compares the employment of treated and control individuals during the reform
period with the employment of treated and control individuals during an earlier
expansionary period.  This triple differences estimator uses the period without reform to
check for the possibility that expansions have differential effects on younger and older
workers.
7  In addition, the triple differences strategy is implemented in samples limited
to narrower age groups, concentrated around the affected age groups.  For example, the
sample for the young is restricted to the 25-35 age group.  Since the 25-30 age group
and the 30-35 age group are likely to face similar age-specific cyclical effects,
restricting the sample in this way is an important robustness check.  In addition, limiting
the sample to narrower age groups also allows to check whether workers not covered by
the reform are being substituted for under 30 and over 45 year olds.  If this were the
case, then we should find much larger effects in the restricted samples.
The following logit model is used to implement the estimation strategy:
Pr[eit=1 | Xit, di] = Λ[αt + β´di + γ′Xit + δ´(di × Rt)],        
    (7)
where eit=1 if employed with a permanent contract and 0 otherwise; di is a vector of
dummies for treated groups, αt is a year effect, and Xit includes covariates affecting
individual i at time t, including quarter dummies and, in some specifications, province-
and sector-specific trends.  The group dummies capture differential permanent
employment rates of the treated groups before and after the reform, while the quarter
and year effects capture the impact of seasonal and macro shocks affecting workers in
both treated and control groups.  The province- and sector-specific trends control for
                                                                                                                                                                         
6 These give the probabilities of being employed with permanent contracts relative to non-employment.
7 This strategy is in the spirit of the falsification test by Angrist and Krueger (1999) which uses the
“Failed Mariel Boatlift” to examine the impact of immigration on the Miami labor market.15
factors affecting employment differentially in different provinces and sectors over time,
including EU active labor market programs introduced in some Spanish regions and
skilled-biased technical change.
8  Rt is a dummy for reform years, so that δ, the vector
of reform/treatment group interactions, captures the effects of interest.
Specifications that control for age-specific cyclical effects include age group
interactions with an expansion dummy, Et, which equals 1 in 1987-90 and 1996-2000
and zero otherwise.  That is, the estimating equation is modified to be
Pr[eit=1 | Xit, di] = Λ[αt + β´di + γ′Xit + δE´(di × Et) + δR´(di × Et × Rt)].      
(8)
Here, the impact of the reform is captured by the third-order term, δR, which measures
the reform impact relative to the pre-treatment expansion.  The age-specific cyclical
effect is captured by the expansion interaction, δE.
Finally, transition probabilities from non-employment to permanent
employment, from temporary employment to permanent employment, and from
permanent employment to non-employment, were estimated by fitting equations (7) and
(8) conditional on the relevant labor market state.  That is, all parameters are free to
vary with employment status in period t-1.  As with the models for employment levels,
some of the specifications for transitions control for age-specific cyclical effects by
allowing differential transition probabilities for treated groups during the expansions of
the late 1980’s and 1990’s.
                                                          
8 We include interactions of province and sector dummies with a time trend because both active labor
market programs and technical change increased during the 1990’s.  However, in contrast to the sharp
timing of the 1997 reform which was introduced after the second quarter of 1997, the timing of EU active
labor market programs and especially skilled-biased technical change cannot be identified precisely.  In
addition, the inclusion of sector- and province-specific trends helps to control for the serial correlation
problem in differences-in-differences inference pointed out by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2001).16
V.  Estimates of the Impact of the 1997 Reform
A.  Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data comes from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (LFS) from the second
quarter of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 2000.
9  The LFS has information on basic
individual and family information, including information about sex, age, province of
residence, education, marital status, and whether the person is a household head or not.
The LFS also includes labor force information including employment status,
occupation, sector, tenure and type of contract in the current and previous jobs.
10   We
exclude individuals in the military, workers employed in agriculture, as well as
employers, coop members, family workers and the self-employed from our sample.  Our
samples include men and women between 16 and 65 years of age to focus on young and
older workers affected by the reform.
11
The LFS has a rotating panel structure that follows individuals for a maximum
of six quarters, replacing one-sixth of the sample every quarter.  In practice, there is
attrition and not everyone is followed for six quarters.  Jiménez and Peracchi (2002)
report an attrition rate of about 20% in the rotating panel, which is close to that found
for similar data sets in other countries.
12  To identify transitions, we match individual
records from one quarter to the next using the personal identification number of the
                                                          
9 The LFS underwent a number of methodological changes in 1995.  Prior to 1995 the LFS sampled
randomly out of the 1980 population Census, while after 1995 the LFS sampled randomly out of the 1991
population Census.  Most importantly, prior to 1995, individuals between 25 and 45 years of age were
under-sampled because of problems with the sampling framework which was corrected after 1995.  These
methodological changes have reduced the figures on aggregate unemployment estimated with the LFS,
but as shown in Figures 2-6, they do not appear to have affected estimates of individual employment
probabilities for those in particular age groups.
10 The Spanish LFS does not have earnings information, so we cannot study the effect of payroll taxes and
dismissal costs on wages.  The presence of downward wage rigidities in the Spanish context, however,
probably implies that most adjustments take place through quantities rather than through prices.
11 Analysis on the more restrictive sample of workers between 21 and 59 years of age, who have stronger
labor market attachment, shows similar results.
12 Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) report an attrition rate of around 29% in the CPS.17
individual.
13  We restrict ourselves to matches with the same sex in consecutive
quarters.
The impact of the 1997 reform on employment levels is evaluated by looking at
employment probabilities.  The effects on worker flows are evaluated by looking at
transition probabilities.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for men by age group for the periods
before and after the reform.  The table shows lower permanent employment
probabilities for young men and women and middle-aged and older men after the
reform, probably reflecting the fact that the pre-reform period includes the strong
expansion of the late 1980’s.  On the other hand, permanent employment probabilities
are higher for middle-aged and older women after the reform.  Simple comparisons of
means also indicate lower transitions during the post-reform period.  However, as
shown in the regressions below, controlling for year effects and other covariates shows
a different picture.  Men and women are also older, more educated, less likely to be
married, and have shorter tenures during the reform period.  In contrast, men are less
likely and women more likely to be the head of household during the reform period.
B.  Employment Effects
Table 3 reports logit marginal effects estimated using equations (7) and (8).  The
dependent variable is a discrete variable which takes the value of 1 if the person is
employed with a permanent contract and 0 if the person is non-employed (either
unemployed or out of the labor force).  The controls in these logits are head of
household and marital status dummies, four schooling groups, tenure, seven occupation
groups, 10 sector groups, 15 province main effects, year effects, quarter effects and
under 30 and over 45 age groups.  The effects of interest are captured by the interactions
                                                          
13 Including year and quarter effects helps us control for cohort effects.18
of the under 30 and over 45 age groups with the reform dummy.  The marginal effects
of these interactions capture the change in permanent employment probabilities of
younger and older relative to middle-aged workers during the reform years.  Panels A
and B show the results for men and women, respectively.  The results show a large and
statistically significant increase in permanent employment probabilities for young
relative to middle-aged workers after the 1997 reform became effective, but
insignificant effects for older workers.  The reported standard errors allow for clustering
by year-age group to control for common random effects within these cells.
14  F o r
example, Column (1) shows that the probability of permanent employment increased by
0.0222 for younger men and by 0.016 for young women relative to middle-aged
workers during the reform years.  Columns (2) and (3) report the results for
specifications which control for sector- and province-specific trends.  The results do not
change.
Column (4) controls for age-specific cyclical effects by including interactions of
the under 30 and over 45 age groups with an expansion dummy.  The results show that
while expansions do seem to disproportionately benefit younger workers, they do not
benefit older relative to middle-aged workers.  Moreover, controlling for the beneficial
effects of expansions on younger workers, the results become smaller and remain
significant when standard errors are not corrected for clustering but become
insignificant after accounting for correlation of shocks within each year-age group cell.
Nonetheless, since the expansion of the late 1980’s was stronger in terms of GDP
growth, our control for age-specific cyclical effects probably provides a lower bound of
                                                          
14 As is typical in data with a group structure like ours, adjusting for group clustering seems much more
important than adjusting for the fact that the rotation group structure means that some individuals are
followed through time (see, e.g., studies using the CPS).  Since the two-way adjustment is complex, we19
the effect of the reform.  The next two columns limit the sample to narrower age groups
to further control for age-specific cyclical effects.  Column (5) uses the 25-30 age group
as the treated and the 30-35 age group as the control for young workers, while Column
(6) uses the 45-55 age group as the treated and the 40-45 age group as the control for
older workers.  The results in Column (5) of Panel A show that permanent employment
probabilities increase by 0.014 (i.e., 2.5%) for young men relative to middle-aged men
during the reform years.  The results in Column (5) of Panel B show insignificant
effects for young women.  In addition, the effects of the reform on older workers remain
insignificant after controlling for age-specific cyclical effects.
C.  Effects on Worker Flows
Table 4 reports logit marginal effects from models for transitions from non-
employment to permanent employment.  The dependent variable is a discrete variable
which takes the value of 1 if the person transited from non-employment to permanent
employment from one quarter to the next and 0 if the person continues to be non-
employed the next quarter.
15  As before, Panel A reports the results for men and Panel B
for women.  The results show increased transitions from non-employment to permanent
employment for young relative to middle-aged workers after the 1997 reform became
effective.  For example, Column (1) in Panel A shows an increase in the relative
transition probabilities from non-employment to permanent employment of 0.045 or
45% for younger men during the reform years.  Column (1) in Panel B also shows an
increase in the relative probability of transiting from non-employment to permanent
employment of 0.01 or 16% (with a p-value of 0.187) for younger women during the
                                                                                                                                                                         
report standard errors correcting only for the former.  The latter increases standard errors by only about a
third, with little effect on significance levels, while group-clustering more than triples the standard errors.
15 The controls are as in the permanent employment probability specifications.20
reform years.  Controlling for sector- and province-specific trends in Columns (2) and
(3) does not change the results.  The results for older workers are insignificant.
The rest of the columns in Table 4 report results which control for age-specific
cyclical effects.  Column (4) in Panel A shows a smaller effect on the probability of
transiting from non-employment to permanent employment for young men during the
expansion of the late 1980’s, but a larger and now significant effect for older men.  The
transition from non-employment to permanent employment falls to 0.037 or 37% for
younger men, but increases to 0.05 or 20% for older men.  Results on the restricted
sample of younger men in Column (5) now show no significant effect of the reform on
transitions from non-employment to permanent employment.  On the contrary, results
on the restricted sample of older men in Column (6) now show a large and significant
effect of 0.052 or 21% of the reform on the transitions from non-employment to
permanent employment.  The results for women in Panel B continue to show increased
transitions from non-employment to employment of between 13% and 16% (with p-
values of 0.17) for the full and restricted samples.  The results for older women are
insignificant.
Table 5 reports logit marginal effects from models for transitions from
temporary to permanent employment.
16  The results in Panel A show a statistically
significant increase in the transitions from temporary to permanent employment for
younger relative to middle-aged men during the reform years.  The results without
controlling for age-specific cyclical effects suggest an increase of about 0.03 or 36%,
while the results which control for age-specific cyclical effects indicate an increase of
between 0.024 and 0.028 (or between 29% and 33%).   On the contrary, the results
show no significant change in the transitions from temporary to permanent employment21
for older men.  The results in Panel B also show a significant increase in temporary to
permanent transition probabilities for young women but not for older women.  The
results without controlling for age-specific cyclical effects suggest an increase of about
0.0225 or 26%, while the results which control for age-specific cyclical effects indicate
an increase of between 0.01 and 0.02 (or between 13% and 23%).
Table 6 reports logit marginal effects from models for transitions from
permanent employment to non-employment.
17  There is no change in the transition from
permanent employment to non-employment for young workers during the reform years,
which explains why increased flows from non-employment and temporary to permanent
employment suggested by Tables 4 and 5 translate into a net positive effect on
permanent employment.  On the contrary, Panel A in Table 6 shows a rise in the
transition from permanent employment to non-employment for older relative to middle-
aged men during the reform years of between 7.5% and 8.8%, with and without
controlling for age-specific cyclical effects.  The results become smaller and
insignificant when we restrict the treated group of older workers to those under 55.  In
the case of older men, the increased flows from non-employment to permanent
employment shown in Table 4 and the increased flows from permanent employment to
non-employment shown in this table appear to cancel out, explaining the weak net effect
on permanent employment.  On the other hand, the effects for older women are
insignificant as was the case with the other flows.
D.  Economic Interpretation of Magnitudes
Estimates of the net effect on young men and women in Table 3 can be
compared to the effect of the 1997 reform on the costs of employing young men to
                                                                                                                                                                         
16 The controls are as in the permanent employment probability specifications.22
estimate elasticities of permanent employment with respect to non-wage labor costs.
We concentrate on young workers because the results for older workers and young
women show insignificant effects after controlling for age-specific cyclical effects,
suggesting no response to the reform by this group of workers.
The 1997 reform reduced dismissal costs from 45 to 33 days per year worked or,
equivalently, a reduction of 26.7%.  In addition, the reform reduced the uniform payroll
tax rate of 28.3% of the salary of young workers by 40% for contracts signed in 1997
and 1998 during the first two years of the contract, and by 35% and 25% for contracts
signed after 1999 during the first and second years of the contract, respectively.  To
estimate the percent change in total costs implied by the reform, we need to multiply the
changes in dismissal costs and payroll taxes by the fraction of expected dismissal costs
and payroll taxes in total labor costs.  Expected quarterly costs for unfair dismissals are
equal to the probability of an unfair dismissal times the estimated costs of unfair
dismissals.  While we do not have the probability of a dismissal, Table 2 reports
separation rates by age (i.e., 3.3% for young men).  The probability of ruling a dismissal
unfair in Spain is 0.72.
18  Costs for unfair dismissals can be estimated based on the
following formula:
Dismissal Costs = (45/365) × Yearly Salary × Tenure in Years.
Mean salaries from the Survey of Salary Structure for 1995 indicate a yearly
salary of 3,830 Euros for young men.
19  From the LFS we get mean tenures for young
                                                                                                                                                                         
17 The controls are as in the permanent employment probability specifications.
18 Galdón-Sánchez and Güell (2000).
19 Average salaries are low because they include very young workers many of whom still live at home in
Spain.23
men of 2.16 years in 1995.  Combining these numbers, we get quarterly expected
dismissal cost of 24.23 Euros for young men.
20
Payroll tax costs are easier to obtain.  The payroll tax rate is 28.3%, implying a
quarterly payroll tax cost of 271 Euros for young men.  Consequently, dismissal costs
and payroll taxes account for about 1.9% and 21.6% of total labor costs for young men,
respectively.  Multiplying these figures by the corresponding percent changes in
dismissal costs and payroll taxes gives the percent change in total labor costs as a result
of the reform.  Using the larger payroll tax reductions of 40% for young workers, the
percent reductions in total labor costs implied by the reform for young men was of
9.2%.  Using the smaller payroll tax reductions of 30% for young workers applied
during the second year of the contract, the percent reductions in total labor costs implied
by the reform for young men was of 7%.  Of the total labor cost reduction for young
men induced by the reform, 92.7% and 94.4% can be attributed to the larger payroll tax
reduction and to the smaller payroll tax reduction, respectively.  This means that while
payroll tax reductions were smaller in absolute terms for younger than for older
workers, the payroll tax reductions were relatively more important for younger
workers.
21
Results in Table 3 that control for age-specific cyclical effects suggest the
reform increased permanent employment probabilities by 0.0144 or 2.5% for young
men.  These results imply elasticities of between -0.27  and -0.36 for young men using
payroll tax reductions of 40% and 30%, respectively.  The results suggest a moderately
elastic employment response of young men to changes in non-wage labor costs, but an
                                                          
20 This means we do no have to consider the change in the maximum payment of dismissal costs from 42
to 24 months, since it is never binding.24
inelastic response of older workers and young women.
22  This is probably because of
the relative importance of payroll tax reductions for young workers, which suggests a
positive net employment effect when the benefit-contribution linkage is not perfect.  On
the other hand, the inelastic response for young women suggests that other
considerations besides non-labor costs are more important for firms in terms of hiring
women.
VI.  Conclusion
Natural experiments that can be used to assess the consequences of employment
contract regulations in Europe are rare.  This paper uses the Spanish labor market
reform of 1997, which reduced payroll taxes and dismissal costs,  to set up a research
design based on the fact that the reform applied differently to different age groups.  Our
theoretical framework suggests the reduction in dismissal costs should increase
conversions and dismissals, with an ambiguous effect on employment.  On the other
hand, the reduction in payroll taxes should increase conversions and, thus, permanent
employment.  Estimates using the Spanish Labor Force Survey suggest that the reform
increased permanent employment probabilities for young relative to middle-aged
workers.  The results for young men are robust to controls for common macro shocks
for all age groups, for sector- and province-specific trends, and for age-specific cyclical
effects.  The results also show increases in the relative transitions from non-employment
to permanent employment for young and older men, although the results for older men
are not always significant, and from temporary to permanent employment for young
                                                                                                                                                                         
21 Although payroll tax reductions for older workers ranged between 50% and 60%, they only accounted
for between 47% and 51% of the total reduction in non-wage labor costs because of the relatively high
dismissal costs for this group of workers.
22 Katz (1998) and Nickell and Bell (1996) discuss the possibility that high labor costs increase
unemployment rates for disadvantaged workers, including youth.25
men and women during the reform period.  On the other hand, relative transitions from
permanent employment to non-employment increase only for older men.
Our results suggest that the reduction in dismissal costs and payroll taxes
increased both hiring and dismissals for older men, but had a positive effect on the
hiring margin of young workers with little effect on dismissals.  This explains why the
reform seems to have had a positive net effect on permanent employment for young
workers but not for older workers.  This is probably because of the relative importance
of payroll tax reductions for young workers, which suggests positive effects on hiring
and net employment when the benefit-contribution linkage is not perfect.
The estimated elasticities suggest a moderately elastic response of permanent
employment to non-wage labor costs for younger men for whom the payroll tax
reduction was relatively more important.  Further institutional reform along the lines of
the 1997 legislation seems at least as likely to increase employment levels as reforms
promoting the use of temporary contracts.  On balance, the results reported here support
the view, widely discussed though not previously substantiated, that the high non-wage
labor costs and lack of flexibility associated with permanent contracts have reduced
employment levels in Spain, especially for young workers.26
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American Economic Review, 84: 65-70.Table 1: Labor Market Reforms after 1997:
Reductions in Payroll Taxes and Dismissal Costs for Permanent Contracts
Dismissal costs under  existing
permanent contracts
Dismissal costs under new
permanent contracts
Payroll tax reductions for
newly hired workers under
permanent contracts in 1997-
1998
Payroll tax reductions for
newly hired workers under
permanent contracts in 1999
Unemployed aged 30-44
years
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 45 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 45 days’
wages per year of seniority with





Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 45 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 33 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 24 months’ wages
40% of employer contributions
for 24 months
35% of employer contributions
for 12 months, 25% for another
12 months
Unemployed workers
above 45 years of age
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 45 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 33 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 24 months’ wages
60% of employer contributions
for 24 months, 50% thereafter
45% of employer contributions
for 12 months, 40% for another
12 months
Long-term unemployed
(over 1 year of
registered
unemployment)
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 45 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 33 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 24 months’ wages
40% of employer contributions
for 24 months
40% of employer contributions





Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 45 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 33 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 24 months’ wages
50% employer contributions for







with low weight of
female employment
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 45 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 33 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 24 months’ wages
60% employer contributions for
24 months, 20% for another 12
months
45% employer contributions for




Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 45 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 33 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 24 months’ wages
50% employer contributions for
24 months, 20% for another 12
months
25% employer contributions for
24 months
Workers above 45 years
of age hired under
temporary contracts
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 45 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 33 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 24 months’ wages
60% employer contributions for
24 months, 20% for another 12
months
60% employer contributions for
24 months, 20% for another 12
months
Disabled workers Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 45 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages
Fair dismissals: 20 days’ wages
per year of seniority with a
maximum of 12 months’ wages
Unfair dismissals: 33 days’
wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 24 months’ wages
70%-90% for the whole
employment spell
70%-90% for the whole
employment spellTable 2: Descriptive Statistics by Age Group, Before and After the 1997 Reform
Age 16-29 Age 30-44 Age 45-65
Variable Pre-Reform Post-Reform Pre-Reform Post-Reform Pre-Reform Post-Reform
A. MEN
Permanent Employment Probability 0.5709 0.5657 0.8369 0.8329 0.7931 0.8012
Non-employment to Permanent
Employment Transition Probability
0.0967 0.0765 0.4048 0.352 0.2476 0.2446
Temporary to Permanent
Employment Transition Probability
0.0837 0.0551 0.1031 0.0521 0.0997 0.0416
Permanent Employment to Non-
employment Transition Probability

























% Head of Household 21.33 15.64 79.8 75.06 93.52 91.58
% Married 23.82 16.28 82.01 77.93 91.27 91.58
% No Education 1.91 0.87 4.24 1.76 16.03 9.56
% Primary Education 42.95 11.23 46.51 20.84 56.58 44.73
% Secondary Education 34.15 55.63 24.27 42.65 10.78 22.31
% Technical Education 15.61 22.67 13.65 16.62 7.34 7.49
% University Education 5.38 9.58 11.32 18.13 9.27 15.91
N 189,440 29,061 344,099 62,340 330,233 60,956
B. WOMEN
Permanent Employment Probability 0.2483 0.2276 0.5192 0.5316 0.4579 0.4873
Non-employment to Permanent
Employment Transition Probability
0.0575 0.0484 0.1502 0.1424 0.0963 0.1169
Temporary to Permanent
Employment Transition Probability
0.0864 0.058 0.1036 0.0602 0.1383 0.0701
Permanent Employment to Non-
employment Transition Probability

























% Head of Household 2.09 2.86 10.22 13.01 20.89 21.64
% Married 22.37 17.86 76.06 76.4 72.26 74.56
% No Education 1.54 0.94 5.17 3.24 22.97 16.56
% Primary Education 34.14 6.67 41.27 19.9 51.37 43.26
% Secondary Education 36.11 53.33 23.9 39.08 10.21 19.93
% Technical Education 17.18 20.54 13.77 14.62 5.48 5.1
% University Education 11.03 18.52 15.91 23.15 9.97 15.15
N 171,155 29,631 226,127 53,043 139,751 32,905
Notes: The table reports means, probabilities, and percentages for the indicated age group. Standard deviations are in parentheses where
appropriate.Table 3: Permanent Employment Probabilities
        Full Sample     Restricted Age Groups
Regressors    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)
A. MEN
Age < 30 -0.0404* -0.0404* -0.0404* -0.0515* 0.0432* -
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0034)
Age >= 45 -1.0105* -1.0105* -1.0105* -1.0016* - -0.0741
(0.027) (0.027) (0.0105) (0.0243) (0.0043)
Age < 30 x Reform 0.0222** 0.0222** 0.0222** 0.0151 0.0144
+ -
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0118) (0.0091)
Age >= 45 x Reform 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0097 - 0.0081
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.016) (0.0078)
Age < 30 x Expansion - - - 0.0184* 0.0001 -
(0.0166) (0.0029)
Age >= 45 x Expansion - - - 0.0137 - -0.0082
(0.0235) (0.008)
Log –likelihood -283,995 -283,997 -283,994 -283,950 -71,957 -82,050
N 711,989 711,989 711,989 711,989 193,182 282,292
B. WOMEN
Age < 30 -0.0501* -0.0502* -0.0501* -0.069* 0.0068 -
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0075)
Age >= 45 -0.0321
+ -0.0321
+ -0.0321
+ -0.0184 - -0.0064
(0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0176) (0.0066)
Age < 30 x Reform 0.016
+ 0.0161
+ 0.016
+ 0.0057 0.0155 -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.0121) (0.0117)
Age >= 45 x Reform -0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.0036 - 0.0122
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0173) (0.0091)
Age < 30 x Expansion - - - 0.0303** 0.0088 -
(0.0157) (0.0085)
Age >= 45 x Expansion - - - 0.0199 - -0.0021
(0.0271) (0.0104)
Log-likelihood -221,097 -221,099 -221,096 -221,055 -82,834 -54,735
N 465,739 465,739 465,739 465,739 166,295 142,534
Sector Trends NO YES NO NO NO NO
Province  Trends NO NO YES YES YES YES
Note: The table reports logit  marginal effects.  The robust standard errors reported in parenthesis allow for clustering by year/age group.
The logit controls for age and year main effects, quarter effects, head of household and marital status dummies, education, tenure, and
occupation, sector, and province dummies.  The first four columns use the entire sample, while the last two columns restrict the sample
to age groups which allow for more comparable treatment and control groups.  The sample in Column (5) is restricted to the 25-35 age
group and the sample in Column (6) is restricted to the 40-55 age group.  * Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level,
+Significant at 10% level.Table 4: Transition Probabilities from Non-employment to Permanent Employment
        Full Sample     Restricted Age Groups
Regressors    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)
A. MEN
Age < 30 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0053 0.0139 -
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0134)
Age >= 45 -0.1208* -0.1208* -0.1208* -0.0657* - 0.0116
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0182) (0.0135)
Age < 30 x Reform 0.0447* 0.0446* 0.0447* 0.0365* 0.017 -
(0.015) (0.0149) (0.015) (0.0142) (0.0159)
Age >= 45 x Reform 0.0209 0.0209 0.0209 0.0496** - 0.0519*
(0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0251) (0.0184)
Age < 30 x Expansion - - - 0.0052 -0.009 -
(0.0176) (0.0134)
Age >= 45 x Expansion - - - -0.0866* - -0.0812
(0.034) (0.0259)
Log-likelihood -13,310 -13,310 -13,310 -13,295 -4,376 -3,522
N 138,039 138,039 138,039 138,039 38,928 34,898
B. WOMEN
Age < 30 -0.0221* -0.0221* -0.0221* -0.0162* -0.0131* -
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Age >= 45 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.0315* - 0.0174*
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0034) (0.0022)
Age < 30 x Reform 0.0095 0.0095 0.0096 0.0097 0.0077 -
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0057)
Age >= 45 x Reform -0.0061 0.0061 0.0061 0.0029 - -0.0001
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0092)
Age < 30 x Expansion - - - -0.0077 0.0019 -
(0.0054) (0.0064)
Age >= 45 x Expansion - - - -0.0339* - -0.0197*
(0.0098) (0.0076)
Log-likelihood -15,143 -15,143 -15,143 -15,137 -5,452 -3,885
N 153,541 153,541 153,541 153,541 61,246 33,682
Sector Trends NO YES NO NO NO NO
Province  Trends NO NO YES YES YES YES
Note: The table reports logit marginal effects.   The robust standard errors reported in parenthesis allow for clustering by year/age group.
The logit controls for age and year main effects, quarter effects, head of household and marital status dummies, education, tenure, and
occupation, sector, and province dummies.  The first four columns use the entire sample, while the last two columns restrict the sample
to age groups which allow for more comparable treatment and control groups.  The sample in Column (5) is restricted to the 25-35 age
group and the sample in Column (6) is restricted to the 40-55 age group.  * Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level,
+Significant at 10% level.Table 5: Transition Probabilities from Temporary to Permanent Employment
        Full Sample     Restricted Age Groups
Regressors    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)
A. MEN
Age < 30 -0.0174* -0.0195* -0.0195* -0.0235* -0.0088** -
(0.0067) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0039)
Age >= 45 0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0037** - -0.0069
(0.0061) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0017)
Age < 30 x Reform 0.0295* 0.0307* 0.0307* 0.0282* 0.0237* -
(0.0077) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0041)





(0.0084) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0048)
Age < 30 x Expansion - - - 0.0067** -0.0033 -
(0.0029) (0.0041)
Age >= 45 x Expansion - - - 0.0031 - 0.0117*
(0.0026) (0.0036)
Log-likelihood -39,643 -39,448 -39,449 -39,447 -17,335 -7,478
N 176,337 176,337 176,337 176,337 70,219 35,238
B. WOMEN
Age < 30 -0.0203* -0.0203* -0.0203* -0.0306* 0.0237* -
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.002)
Age >= 45 0.0229* 0.0229* 0.0229* 0.0207* - 0.0166
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0025)
Age < 30 x Reform 0.0226* 0.0225* 0.0226* 0.0201* 0.0111
+ -
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0069) (0.007)
Age >= 45 x Reform -0.0105 -0.0105 -0.0105 -0.0103 - -0.0017
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0032)
Age < 30 x Expansion - - - 0.0136* 0.0154 -
(0.0024) (0.0027)
Age >= 45 x Expansion - - - 0.0032 - 0.0045
(0.0047) (0.0043)
Log-likelihood -44,833 -44,833 -44833 -44,828 -17,705 -8,245
N 153,471 153,471 153,471 153,471 58,918 25,097
Sector Trends NO YES NO NO NO NO
Province  Trends NO NO YES YES YES YES
Note: The table reports logit marginal effects.   The robust standard errors reported in parenthesis allow for clustering by year/age group.
The logit controls for age and year main effects, quarter effects, head of household and marital status dummies, and education.  The first
four columns use the entire sample, while the last two columns restrict the sample to age groups which allow for more comparable
treatment and control groups.  The sample in Column (3) is restricted to the 25-35 age group and the sample in Column (4) is restricted
to the 40-55 age group.  * Significant at 1% level.Table 6: Transition Probabilities from Permanent Employment to Non-employment
        Full Sample     Restricted Age Groups
Regressors    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)
A. MEN
Age < 30 0.0098* 0.0098* 0.0098* 0.0098* -0.0012 -
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0009)
Age >= 45 0.0124* 0.0124* 0.0124* 0.0127* - 0.0055
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0007)
Age < 30 x Reform 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.002 -
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0017)
Age >= 45 x Reform 0.0018** 0.0018** 0.0018** 0.0021** - 0.0008
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009)
Age < 30 x Expansion - - - 0.0 0.0004 -
(0.0012) (0.0018)
Age >= 45 x Expansion - - - 0.0006 - 0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0009)
Log-likelihood -39,064 -39,064 -39,064 -39,063 -8,690 -12,840
N 475,228 475,228 475,228 475,228 124,727 220,715
B. WOMEN
Age < 30 0.0276** 0,0276** 0,0276** 0.0311** 0.0172 -
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 0.0011 0.0007*
Age >= 45 0.0026
+ 0.0026
+ 0.0026
+ 0.0032** - -0.002
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 0.001 0.0005
Age < 30 x Reform 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 0.004 0.0003 -
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 0.0028 0.0016
Age >= 45 x Reform -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 - 0.0018
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0019) 0.0022
Age < 30 x Expansion - - - -0.0047 -0.0029** -
(0.0015) 0.0014
Age >= 45 x Expansion - - - -0.0008 - -0.0017
+
(0.0016) 0.001
Log-likelihood -43,159 -43,159 -43,159 -43,155 -14,677 -11,769
N 331,559 331,559 331,559 331,559 117,550 122,170
Sector Trends NO YES NO NO NO NO
Province  Trends NO NO YES YES YES YES
Note: The table reports logit marginal effects.  The robust standard errors reported in parenthesis allow for clustering by year/age group.
The logit controls for age and year main effects, quarter effects, head of household and marital status dummies, and education.  The first
four columns use the entire sample, while the last two columns restrict the sample to age groups which allow for more comparable
treatment and control groups.  The sample in Column (3) is restricted to the 25-35 age group and the sample in Column (4) is restricted
to the 40-55 age group.  * Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level.Figure 1: Number of New Permanent Contracts for Men 
































Regular Perm. Contracts  Youth Long-term Unemployed Over 45 Yrs. Disabled Conversions of Temp. ContractsFigure 2: Number of New Permanent Contracts for Women 






























Regular Perm. Contracts Youth Long-term Unemployed Over 45 Yrs. Disabled Conversions of Temp. ContractsFigure 3: Permanent Employment Probabilities for Men by Age Group 
















































































men 16-29 men 30-44 men 45-64Figure 4: Permanent Employment Probabilities for Women by Age Group 
















































































women 16-29 women 30-44 women 45-64Figure 5: Permanent Employment Probabilities for Men by Age Group 



































































































men 16-29 men 30-44 men 45-64 GDP GrowthFigure 6: Permanent Employment Probabilities for Women by Age Group 































































































women 16-29 women 30-44 women 45-64 GDP Growth